{"tool":"SB 1507 QSBS Fiscal Impact Simulator","url":"https://yex.ai/tools/sb1507-fiscal-impact-model","documentation":"https://yex.ai/llms-full.txt","model":{"horizonYears":6,"simulationCount":4000,"disabledChannels":["companies"],"channels":["companies","startups","investors","founders"],"revenueComparisonBasis":"qsbs_only","totalProjectedRevenue":178.4},"parameters":[{"id":"companyStartingPool","channel":"companies","name":"Starting Firm Pool (500+ employees)","unit":"firms","description":"Year-0 count of Oregon firms with 500+ employees. This is the initial stock from which the simulation draws Binomial departures; organic replenishment partially offsets exits each year.","rationale":"QualityInfo 2025 census reports 319 firms at 500+ employees. Uncertainty arises from classification boundaries (contractors vs W-2, seasonal workers, multi-state headcount allocation). Firms near the 500-employee threshold may shift in or out quarter-to-quarter.","evidence":"research","evidenceNote":"Census count is authoritative. The ±12% uncertainty band reflects boundary classification ambiguity, not measurement error.","distribution":"normal","bounds":{"p20":280,"p80":360},"fit":{"mu":320,"sigma":47.52851711026616},"sources":[{"label":"QualityInfo: Snapshot of Oregon Firms by Size Class (2025)","url":"https://qualityinfo.org/-/a-snapshot-of-oregon-firms-by-size-class-2025"}],"group":"departure-pool"},{"id":"companyEmployees","channel":"companies","name":"Employees per Departing Firm","unit":"employees","description":"Number of employees at a typical departing mid-sized firm. Drives payroll and PIT withholding calculations.","rationale":"The at-risk pool is firms with 500+ employees (QualityInfo 2025). The 400-600 range captures the most mobile tier — large enough to generate significant tax revenue, small enough that relocation is feasible. Larger firms (1000+) have more inertia.","evidence":"research","evidenceNote":"Firm pool size class is well-documented. The specific employee count of departing firms is an informed estimate within the 500+ class.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":350,"p80":650},"fit":{"mu":6.16745275868657,"sigma":0.3677751951082603},"sources":[{"label":"QualityInfo: Snapshot of Oregon Firms by Size Class (2025)","url":"https://qualityinfo.org/-/a-snapshot-of-oregon-firms-by-size-class-2025"}],"group":"revenue-per-company"},{"id":"companyAvgSalary","channel":"companies","name":"Average Salary ($K/yr)","unit":"$K/yr","description":"Average annual salary at the departing firm. Directly determines PIT withholding and payroll tax base.","rationale":"BLS starting salary for Oregon: $67,200. Portland tech salaries range $122K-$199K (QualityInfo), with senior roles at $184K-$281K (Built In). A $100K-$200K P20/P80 range captures the typical mid-to-large traded-sector firm.","evidence":"research","evidenceNote":"Salary ranges well-documented across multiple BLS and industry sources.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":100,"p80":200},"fit":{"mu":4.951743776268064,"sigma":0.41180322038970085},"sources":[{"label":"QualityInfo: Snapshot of Oregon Firms by Size Class (2025)","url":"https://qualityinfo.org/-/a-snapshot-of-oregon-firms-by-size-class-2025"},{"label":"SB 1507 measure overview (OLIS)","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Measures/Overview/SB1507"}],"group":"revenue-per-company"},{"id":"companyGrossRevenue","channel":"companies","name":"Gross Revenue ($M/yr)","unit":"$M/yr","description":"Annual gross revenue of the departing firm. Drives Corporate Activity Tax (CAT) calculation.","rationale":"Reference firm: $200M revenue for a 500-employee tech company. Revenue-per-employee ratios vary by industry: tech firms typically generate $300K-$600K per employee, traditional manufacturing $200K-$400K. The $150M-$300M range spans a reasonable mid-market tech firm.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"Revenue-per-employee ratios are directionally supported by industry benchmarks. Firm-specific revenue data is not publicly available.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":150,"p80":300},"fit":{"mu":5.357208884376228,"sigma":0.4118032203897014},"sources":[{"label":"SB 1507 measure overview (OLIS)","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Measures/Overview/SB1507"}],"group":"revenue-per-company"},{"id":"companyProfitMargin","channel":"companies","name":"Net Profit Margin","unit":"%","description":"Net profit margin of the departing firm. Drives corporate excise tax and local business income tax calculations.","rationale":"Reference: 15% net margin for a mid-sized tech firm. S&P 500 average net margin is ~11%. Tech sector averages 15-25%. A P20/P80 of 8%-22% captures uncertainty across industries and firm stages.","evidence":"assumption","evidenceNote":"Industry averages provide guidance, but firm-specific margins for Oregon's at-risk firms are not publicly available.","distribution":"beta","bounds":{"p20":0.08,"p80":0.22},"fit":{"alpha":2.6145014204081627,"beta":14.815508048979588},"sources":[{"label":"SB 1507 measure overview (OLIS)","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Measures/Overview/SB1507"}],"group":"revenue-per-company"},{"id":"founderRealizationDrop","channel":"founders","name":"QSBS Realization Drop","unit":"%","description":"Percent reduction in QSBS gains actually realized in Oregon after the tax change. Captures lock-in, 1045 rollovers, and deferred exits.","rationale":"Capital gains realization is highly elastic. A 5%-9% range captures a defensible first-order response to imposing a 9.9% state levy on gains that were previously fully exempt.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"The literature supports non-trivial realization drag, but the exact QSBS-specific response is not directly observed in Oregon. This remains a calibrated behavioral assumption.","distribution":"normal","bounds":{"p20":5,"p80":9},"fit":{"mu":7,"sigma":2.376425855513308},"sources":[{"label":"Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains (NBER)","url":"https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27705/w27705.pdf"},{"label":"Behavioral Responses to Capital Gains (Budget Lab)","url":"https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/behavioral-responses-capital-gains-realizations"}]},{"id":"founderFlightRisk","channel":"founders","name":"Pre-Exit Flight Risk","unit":"%","description":"Share of each annual founder exit cohort that changes domicile before realizing the gain — typically across the river to Vancouver, WA. Border proximity is included in this rate; there is no separate multiplier.","rationale":"A 15%-30% range reflects high-earner migration evidence under large one-time tax exposures, widened upward for the Portland-Vancouver corridor: a founder can change domicile before an exit without leaving the metro labor market, investors, or social graph. The prior model expressed this as a 10%-20% base rate multiplied by a separate 1.3x-2.0x Vancouver multiplier; the multiplier is now folded into this range so border proximity is never applied twice. This applies to the current year's liquidity cohort, not the whole founder population.","evidence":"research","evidenceNote":"Tax-motivated migration for high earners is well-documented, and pre-exit domicile changes ahead of large liquidity events are a widely observed pattern. The specific 15%-30% founder-cohort range is still a model translation rather than a directly observed Oregon QSBS panel.","distribution":"normal","bounds":{"p20":15,"p80":30},"fit":{"mu":22.5,"sigma":8.911596958174904},"sources":[{"label":"Rauh & Shyu: Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners (NBER / AEJ 2024)","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w26349"},{"label":"WA Dept of Revenue Border Tax Study","url":"https://dor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/Border%2520Issues.pdf"},{"label":"Portland (OR) & Vancouver (WA) Tax Comparison 2024","url":"https://www.greaterportlandinc.com/media/userfiles/subsite_214/files/OR%20%26%20WA%20Tax%20Comparison%202024.pdf"},{"label":"Portland to Vancouver Relocation Trends (2025 Guide)","url":"https://greenbuckrealestate.com/blog/portland-to-vancouver-relocation-trends-explained"}]},{"id":"founderInboundReduction","channel":"founders","name":"Long-Run Inbound Founder Flow Reduction","unit":"%","description":"Long-run percentage reduction in the annual flow of QSBS-scale founders arriving in Oregon once the state disconnect is in place. Because a §1202 exit requires a five-year minimum holding period, this reduction cannot touch exit cohorts inside the first five horizon years — it phases in linearly from year 6 to year 12. Everyone exiting earlier already held Oregon QSBS when SB 1507 passed.","rationale":"Derived from Moretti & Wilson (2017), Table 2A column 6: a net-of-tax elasticity of 1.8895 (s.e. 0.6160) implies the annual founder flow falls to (0.901/1.000)^1.89 ≈ 82.2% of baseline — a 17.8% reduction — when Oregon's after-tax QSBS keep rate drops from 100% to 90.1%. Scaling that empirical response by a 40%-80% transportability judgment (founders share the star-scientist study population's income and national labor-market access, but many have family, operating-company, or investor ties) gives the 6%-17% P20-P80 band.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"The elasticity is empirically estimated for star scientists at the 99th income percentile; its transfer to founders is a judgment. Note the timing honestly: within a six-year horizon this mechanism contributes almost nothing, because the QSBS holding period means missing arrivals cannot subtract from near-term exit cohorts. It matters for ten-year-plus horizons and for the durable-tax-base argument, not for the published LRO window.","distribution":"beta","bounds":{"p20":0.06,"p80":0.17},"fit":{"alpha":2.625469834895867,"beta":20.204702642459498},"sources":[{"label":"Moretti & Wilson: State Taxes and the Geographical Location of Top Earners (AER, 2017)","url":"https://eml.berkeley.edu/~moretti/taxes.pdf"}]},{"id":"founderAnnualTaxBase","channel":"founders","name":"Annual Tax Base per Departed Founder","unit":"$M/yr","description":"Annual state and local tax revenue lost for each founder-equivalent who leaves Oregon or never exits here: personal income tax on ongoing post-exit income plus the follow-on business and payroll footprint their next venture would anchor in-state.","rationale":"$0.25M-$0.55M/yr merges three previous sliders into the quantity the model actually uses: post-exit annual income ($1.2M-$2.0M/yr) × an effective state rate (8.5%-9.9%) ≈ $0.10M-$0.20M/yr of personal income tax, plus a founder-linked business tax footprint of $0.15M-$0.40M/yr covering payroll, transit, and local business taxes from the companies and teams a post-exit founder anchors.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"Post-exit founder income and the follow-on business footprint vary widely and are not observable from public data. The range is a structured modeling assumption, not a measured Oregon average.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":0.25,"p80":0.55},"fit":{"mu":-0.9920656809377555,"sigma":0.4684276142848563},"sources":[{"label":"Oregon Income Tax Calculator (SmartAsset)","url":"https://smartasset.com/taxes/oregon-tax-calculator"},{"label":"Portland (OR) & Vancouver (WA) Tax Comparison 2024","url":"https://www.greaterportlandinc.com/media/userfiles/subsite_214/files/OR%20%26%20WA%20Tax%20Comparison%202024.pdf"},{"label":"Portland Metro Chamber 2025 State of the Economy","url":"https://portlandmetrochamber.com/resources/2025-state-of-the-economy/"},{"label":"SB 1507 measure overview (OLIS)","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Measures/Overview/SB1507"}]},{"id":"founderAverageExitSize","channel":"founders","name":"Average Founder Exit Size","unit":"$M","description":"Average taxable QSBS gain per founder exit used to translate the LRO revenue baseline into the number of founder exit events in a typical year.","rationale":"$12M-$22M represents meaningful founder outcomes short of unicorn-only exits, adjusted upward from $10M-$20M to reflect the OBBBA (July 2025) expansion of the QSBS gain exclusion cap from $10M to $15M and the corporate gross asset threshold from $50M to $75M. The larger cap shifts the distribution of qualifying exits upward. Smaller exits create many more founders; larger exits imply fewer, higher-value cohorts.","evidence":"assumption","evidenceNote":"Average Oregon QSBS exit size is not publicly reported. The upward shift from $10M-$20M to $12M-$22M reflects the OBBBA's expanded caps, which widen the gap between Oregon (non-conforming) and conforming states.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":12,"p80":22},"fit":{"mu":2.787974551573158,"sigma":0.36010919888920845},"sources":[{"label":"SB 1507 measure overview (OLIS)","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Measures/Overview/SB1507"},{"label":"SB 1507 LRO Measure Analysis","url":"https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2026R1/Downloads/MeasureAnalysisDocument/94494"},{"label":"The OBBBA: How New QSBS Rules Affect Startups and Investors (Baker Donelson)","url":"https://www.bakerdonelson.com/the-one-big-beautiful-bill-act-how-new-qsbs-rules-and-related-provisions-affect-startups-and-investors"},{"label":"Tax Reform 2025: What the OBBBA Means for Startups & VC + QSBS in NJ (Lowenstein Sandler)","url":"https://www.lowenstein.com/news-insights/publications/client-alerts/tax-reform-2025-what-the-obbba-means-for-startups-venture-capital-plus-qsbs-in-new-jersey-tax"}]},{"id":"startupVcLossRate","channel":"startups","name":"QSBS-Sensitive Deal Loss Rate","unit":"%","description":"Share of baseline VC deals that would not be funded once the state QSBS benefit disappears — before adjusting for how much of Oregon's startup funding actually comes from Oregon-resident investors (the next parameter).","rationale":"Junqueira (2025, Oxford/PitchBook): VCs are 74% more likely to invest in pre-commercial startups with full QSBS. Oregon disconnects only the state slice — 9.9% of a ~29.9% combined federal-plus-state benefit, about 33% — scaling the multiplier to 1 + 0.74 × 0.33 = 1.24×. Inverting: P(funded | no state QSBS) = P(funded | QSBS) / 1.24, so θ ≈ 19.4%. The 15%-24% band spans that state-scaled point estimate, which was previously hard-coded with no uncertainty at all.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"The underlying VC sensitivity to QSBS is empirical. The linear state-share scaling and the transfer from federal eligibility to a state disconnect are both judgments this slider makes adjustable.","distribution":"beta","bounds":{"p20":0.15,"p80":0.24},"fit":{"alpha":10.511598803911111,"beta":43.39403608794074},"sources":[{"label":"Campello & Junqueira: Tax Incentives and Venture Capital Risk-Taking (Oxford Saïd working paper, 2025)","url":"https://oxfordtax.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sitefiles/wp25.10-guilherme-junqueira.pdf"},{"label":"Q4 2024 PitchBook-NVCA Venture Monitor","url":"https://nvca.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Q4-2024-PitchBook-NVCA-Venture-Monitor.pdf"}]},{"id":"startupResidentFundingShare","channel":"startups","name":"Oregon-Resident Funding Share","unit":"%","description":"Share of Oregon VC deal funding supplied by Oregon-resident investors — the only investors whose QSBS math SB 1507 changes. An out-of-state fund investing in an Oregon startup keeps its full federal and home-state treatment, so its willingness to fund is unaffected by the disconnect.","rationale":"Oregon startups are largely funded from out of state, particularly at larger round sizes (Oregon holds ~0.32% of national VC investment, and Oregon Venture Fund documents the dependence on out-of-state capital). Only Oregon-resident investors lose the state QSBS benefit, so a 15%-40% resident share multiplies the QSBS-sensitive loss rate, putting the effective deal-loss rate near 3%-8% rather than the full 19.4%.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"Directionally solid — the disconnect only binds Oregon residents — but the exact resident share of deal funding is unmeasured. Smaller seed rounds skew more local, which the upper half of the band represents.","distribution":"beta","bounds":{"p20":0.15,"p80":0.4},"fit":{"alpha":2.2103915750400005,"beta":5.8273959705600005},"sources":[{"label":"Oregon Venture Fund: Trade-offs to Investing Regionally","url":"https://www.oregonventurefund.com/perspectives/trade-offs-to-investing-regionally"},{"label":"NVCA 2025 Yearbook: US VC Deal Flow by State (PitchBook data)","url":"https://nvca.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-NVCA-Yearbook.pdf"},{"label":"Current State of Venture Capital: Oregon Trends","url":"https://elevate.vc/current-state-venture-capital-industry-oregon-trends-challenges/"}]},{"id":"investorPrivateMarketOwnership","channel":"investors","name":"Private-Market Ownership Rate","unit":"%","description":"Share of Oregon's high-income resident-return pool assumed to own a private fund or offering. The simulation derives the starting investor pool by multiplying this rate by the fixed DOR return count.","rationale":"SEC Office of Investor Research survey data reports that 4.3% of accredited investors own a private fund or offering. The model centers the rate at 4.3% and uses a judgmental P20-P80 range of 3.0%-5.6% because the SEC estimate is national, the DOR denominator is tax returns rather than verified accredited individuals, and the SEC ownership category is broader than active angel investors and venture LPs.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"The 77,080-return denominator is authoritative. The 4.3% midpoint is measured nationally, not in Oregon, and does not isolate active angels/VC LPs. The 3.0%-5.6% uncertainty band is a disclosed modeling judgment, not an SEC confidence interval.","distribution":"beta","bounds":{"p20":0.03,"p80":0.056},"fit":{"alpha":7.373066200509345,"beta":164.09358962528938},"sources":[{"label":"Oregon DOR: Tax Year 2024 Personal Income Tax Statistics (Exhibit 20)","url":"https://www.oregon.gov/dor/programs/gov-research/Documents/TY%202024%20Oregon%20Personal%20Income%20Tax%20Statistics%20Report-UA-Secured%20.pdf"},{"label":"SEC OIR: Exploring Accredited Investors and Private Market Securities Ownership (2025)","url":"https://www.sec.gov/files/exploring-accredited-investors-june-2025.pdf"}],"group":"departure-pool"},{"id":"investorAnnualGains","channel":"investors","name":"Annual Realized Private-Market Gains","unit":"$M/yr","description":"Average annual capital gains a representative active angel investor realizes from their private portfolio. Drives both the revenue lost when an investor departs and — as a share of their total income — the effective tax increase SB 1507 actually imposes on them.","rationale":"Merges the previous deployed-capital ($0.75M-$1.25M) and annual-realization-rate (5%-12%) sliders into the product the model actually uses. Midpoint: ~$1.0M deployed × 8.5%/yr realized ≈ $85K/yr; the $55K-$125K band propagates both input ranges. Angel returns are lumpy and power-law distributed — most years realize little, exit years realize a lot — so this is the long-run annual average, consistent with 8-10 year mean time to liquidity and Wiltbank-Boeker's 2.6× average multiple.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"Angel portfolio benchmarks are well-established nationally. Oregon-specific portfolios may skew smaller given the 26% decline in local deal sizes.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":0.055,"p80":0.125},"fit":{"mu":-2.489931817714751,"sigma":0.48774985270308363},"sources":[{"label":"Angel Returns Beat All Asset Classes (ACA / Angel Resource Institute)","url":"https://angelcapitalassociation.org/blog/angel-returns-beat-classes/"},{"label":"Wiltbank & Boeker: ACEF Angel Performance Project (ACA / Kauffman Foundation)","url":"https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Resources/AngelGroupResarch/1d%20-%20Resources%20-%20Research/ACEF%20Angel%20Performance%20Project%2004.28.09.pdf"}]},{"id":"investorMigrationSensitivity","channel":"investors","name":"Migration Sensitivity (per 1pp tax increase)","unit":"%","description":"Share of the at-risk investor pool that relocates each year per percentage point of effective tax increase. The simulation multiplies this by the effective average-rate change SB 1507 imposes on the representative investor — 9.9% × the private-gains share of their income — not by the headline 9.9 points.","rationale":"Rauh & Shyu (2024) estimate ~0.27% of the affected tax base migrates per 1% tax increase, validated against CA Prop 30 (~0.8% departure response to a ~3pp hike). The prior model multiplied that elasticity by the full 9.9 QSBS points, implicitly treating the disconnect as an across-the-board income tax hike and producing a 2.67%/yr exit rate. The corrected form applies the elasticity to the rate change on total income: for the representative investor, 9.9% × ~20% gains share ≈ 2pp, giving ~0.5%/yr departures. The 0.15%-0.40% band spans the literature around the Rauh & Shyu midpoint.","evidence":"research","evidenceNote":"The elasticity itself is empirically estimated. The gains-share translation assumes realized private gains proxy the QSBS-eligible slice of income; investors expecting outsized one-time QSBS exits behave more like founders and are captured by the flight-risk logic there.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":0.0015,"p80":0.004},"fit":{"mu":-6.01187554436811,"sigma":0.582716999175218},"sources":[{"label":"Rauh & Shyu: Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners (NBER / AEJ 2024)","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w26349"},{"label":"Young et al.: Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite (ASR)","url":"https://cristobalyoung.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Millionaire_migration_Jun16ASRFeature.pdf"}]},{"id":"startupRevPerEntity","channel":"startups","name":"Annual Tax Revenue per Lost Startup","unit":"$M/yr","description":"Annual state payroll-based tax revenue a representative Seed-stage startup would have generated: headcount × salary × (PIT 8.5% + employer payroll 2.0%). Corporate profit taxes are excluded — early-stage startups operate at a loss. Cohort growth and failure over time is applied separately via the maturation schedule.","rationale":"Merges the previous employees (5-16) and average-salary ($96K-$130K) sliders into the product the model actually uses. Midpoint: ~9 employees × $113K × 10.5% combined tax yield ≈ $0.11M/yr; the $0.06M-$0.19M band propagates both input ranges. Headcount benchmarks: Pre-Seed <5, Seed <10, Series A median 44 (down from 57 in 2020); Elevate Capital's Oregon portfolio averages ~13 employees across all stages. Salary anchored to Oregon QCEW NAICS 51 average ($129K) and Kruze startup compensation data.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"Headcount and salary benchmarks are well-documented; combining them into a single per-startup revenue figure trades slider granularity for fewer, higher-leverage inputs. The derivation is shown statically in the drill-down.","distribution":"lognormal","bounds":{"p20":0.06,"p80":0.19},"fit":{"mu":-2.2370709617908435,"sigma":0.6848143476344971},"sources":[{"label":"Oregon Blue Book: Economy — Wages","url":"https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Pages/facts/economy-wages.aspx"},{"label":"A Guide to Startup Compensation (Kruze Consulting)","url":"https://kruzeconsulting.com/blog/startup-compensation-guide/"},{"label":"Oregon Payroll Tax Calculator & Employer Requirements (GoCo)","url":"https://www.goco.io/blog/oregon-employer-payroll-taxes-guide"},{"label":"Payroll and Self-Employment Tax Information (TriMet)","url":"https://trimet.org/taxinfo/"},{"label":"Elevate Capital Celebrates 10-Year Milestone (PRNewswire, 2025)","url":"https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/elevate-capital-celebrates-10-year-milestone-in-funding-underrepresented-entrepreneurs-302701729.html"},{"label":"Startup Fundraising Indicators: A Guide (OAK'S LAB)","url":"https://www.oakslab.com/story/startup-fundraising-indicators"}]},{"id":"investorOrdinaryIncome","channel":"investors","name":"Investor Ordinary Income","unit":"$K/yr","description":"Annual ordinary income (salary, business income, market yields) for a departing investor. Combined with capital gains to compute total lost PIT at 9.9%.","rationale":"OR DOR data: HNWI migrants ($200K+ AGI) carry avg $35,100 in state income tax liability, implying ~$354K taxable income at 9.9%. Consistent with SEC accreditation thresholds ($200K individual / $300K joint). Many angels are executives, serial entrepreneurs, or professionals.","evidence":"directional","evidenceNote":"OR DOR income data is authoritative. Inverse-derived income from actual tax liability is more defensible than assumed income profiles. The $319M AGI loss from age-55+ HNWIs (2022) provides independent validation.","distribution":"normal","bounds":{"p20":266,"p80":434},"fit":{"mu":350,"sigma":99.80988593155894},"sources":[{"label":"Oregon DOR: Tax Year 2023 Personal Income Tax Statistics","url":"https://www.oregon.gov/dor/gov-research/pages/personal_income_tax_statistics.aspx"},{"label":"Rauh & Shyu: Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners (NBER / AEJ 2024)","url":"https://www.nber.org/papers/w26349"}]}],"results":{"medianNetRevenue":59.5356205888014,"netRevenueP10":-7.148768554913971,"netRevenueP90":104.9610499911982,"probabilityNetPositive":0.8785,"medianTotalLoss":118.8643794111986,"byChannel":{"companies":{"median":0,"p10":0,"p90":0},"startups":{"median":15.35711130729702,"p10":4.027338012186215,"p90":50.42689532191251},"investors":{"median":13.575138141283409,"p10":4.422618302470957,"p90":39.133995780471935},"founders":{"median":78.10163257160875,"p10":44.20302914935682,"p90":126.62215402141831}}}}